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Introduction

The welfare costs of unpredictable catastrophic events have been addressed in a variety
of studies. In most, the events are “generic,” in that the cause is unspecified, and each
event reduces GDP and consumption by some (random) amount. One can think of these
events as destroying a random part of the capital stock or reducing its productivity, and
reducing output accordingly. Welfare costs arise in part from the direct impact of the
events on consumption and in part from their unpredictability.1 In Martin and Pindyck
(2015), we considered different types of catastrophic events (e.g., nuclear terrorism, a climate
catastrophe, or a financial crisis), explored their policy interdependence, and developed a
rule for determining which events it is optimal to avert. But as with generic disasters, we
assumed that the impact of each type of catastrophic event is a reduction in consumption.
Some catastrophic events kill people but cause little or no drop in the consumption of
those who survive. Perhaps the best example—and the one we focus on in this paper—is a
major pandemic that spreads uncontrollably. Most of the damage from such an event would
be the deaths of a significant fraction of the population. Indeed, the Spanish Flu pandemic
of 1918–1919 infected about 20 percent and killed about 4 to 5 percent of the populations of
Europe and the U.S., but had a minimal impact on GDP and the consumption of survivors.
Thus an equally virulent pandemic today might kill more than ten million people in the U.S.
alone. Epidemiologists have argued that new and more virulent pandemics are very likely to
occur in the next couple of decades, and because of modern travel, could kill an even larger
fraction of the population.2 Indeed, as we write this paper, the COVID-19 coronavirus has
developed into a worldwide pandemic that is spreading rapidly.
We explore the welfare implications of the threat of pandemics, but in the context of a
world also threatened by “generic” consumption disasters. As usual, we measure the benefit
from averting either threat in terms of “willingness to pay” (WTP), i.e., the maximum
fraction of consumption society would be willing to sacrifice, now and throughout the future,
to eliminate the threat. We examine the WTP to avoid future pandemics, and ask how that
WTP is affected by ongoing economic uncertainty. In particular, what is the WTP to avoid
1

Barro (2006, 2009), Martin (2008), Pindyck and Wang (2013), and others refer to (generic) catastrophes
as “consumption disasters.” The potential for such catastrophes can help explain the equity premium and
low risk-free rate “puzzles.” As discussed below, Barro (2006, 2009), Barro and Ursúa (2008) and others use
historical data for a panel of countries to estimate the mean arrival rate and impact distribution of these
events; Martin (2008) and Pindyck and Wang (2013) use data on aggregate economic and financial variables
to get the mean arrival rate and impact distribution as outputs of a general equilibrium model.
2

See, e.g., Byrne (2008), Kilbourne (2008), Enserink (2004), and Harvard Global Health Institute (2018).
Johnson and Mueller (2002) estimated the Spanish Flu U.S. mortality rate to be 6.5 percent.
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a pandemic, the WTP to avoid consumption disasters, and the WTP to avoid both?
Why include consumption disasters in a study of the threat of pandemics? First, as
we showed in Martin and Pindyck (2015), with multiple potential catastrophes, simple costbenefit analysis breaks down: because they are “non-marginal,” considering them in isolation
can lead to sub-optimal policies, even if the catastrophes occur independently of one another.
Second, general economic uncertainty is a form of “background risk” that raises the WTP
to avert a pandemic, and we want to determine by how much. Third, the welfare effects of
consumption disasters provides a scale that can help us evaluate the importance of averting
pandemics. And finally, combining the two in one model is natural because the framework
we develop works by relating the welfare effects of fatalities to losses of consumption.3
Here we show how to incorporate death in a model of catastrophe avoidance, and how
a catastrophic loss of life can be expressed as a welfare-equivalent drop in consumption.
We want to find the WTP to avert a catastrophe that would kill some fraction ψ of the
population (chosen at random), leaving the consumption of those who live unchanged, as
opposed to reducing the consumption of everyone by ψ. As one would expect, the WTP to
avert the deaths of some fraction of the population is much greater than the WTP to avert
a drop in consumption by the same fraction; a drop in consumption causes a marginal loss
of utility, whereas death causes a total loss (albeit for only a fraction of the population).
We proxy for the value of a life lost by the “value of a statistical life” (VSL). The VSL
is the marginal rate of substitution between wealth (or consumption, or discounted lifetime
consumption) and the probability of survival. Thus it is a local measure; we might expect an
individual (or society) to be willing to pay more than the VSL to avoid certain death. Its use
is appropriate in our context, however, because for each individual even a severe pandemic
implies a small probability of death. Furthermore, the VSL is used widely in public policy
applications. Many studies have estimated the VSL using data on risk-of-death choices made
by individuals, and typically find numbers in the range of 3 to 10 times average lifetime
income or consumption. (So as society becomes richer, the VSL will increase.) Here we link
the VSL literature to the literature on consumption disasters.
In Martin and Pindyck (2015) we assumed that there are N types of potential catastrophes, all of which would cause a drop in consumption. We now allow for just two types of
catastrophes, one of which is a generic consumption disaster and the other is an event (e.g.,
3

Barro (2014) develops a model with two catastrophes, a consumption disaster and also an environmental
catastrophe (e.g., from climate change), with different probabilities of occurring. But he assumes the two
catastrophes have the same impact distribution and simply adds the probabilities, in effect modeling a single
catastrophe, but with a greater likelihood of occurring than the consumption disasters in the earlier papers.
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a pandemic) that kills people. Thus the WTP to avoid the second type results from lives
saved, as opposed to consumption saved.4
Determining the WTP to avert a catastrophe that kills people introduces a fundamental
issue: How should society value the very existence of people, alive now and potentially in
the future, relative to the consumption enjoyed by those people? We want to be clear that
we do not have anything new to say about the hard philosophical question regarding the
value of human life. To our knowledge, there is no consensus regarding the social value of
more or fewer people, although economists tend to value changes in population asymmetrically. Increases in population are seen by some as “good” (on purely ethical grounds, but
also by contributing to technological change), and by some as “bad” (because of crowding,
congestion, and environmental stress). Based on social norms, decreases in population are
seen as purely “bad,” in that we go to great lengths to save lives and prevent life-threatening
disasters.5 Consistent with these social norms, the model we develop treats deaths caused
by catastrophes as a pure “bad” that reduces social welfare. However, the model leaves open
the welfare effects of “natural” increases (or decreases) in population.
Using middle-of-the-road estimates of the VSL and conservative estimates of the likelihood and impact distribution, we find the WTP to avert future pandemics to be large —
more than 10% of consumption. Also, a good portion of that WTP comes from “background
risk,” here the threat of consumption catastrophes, which we assess using estimates from
Barro and Ursúa (2008). Likewise, the threat of pandemics substantially affects the WTP
to avert consumption catastrophes. This is another example of the policy interdependence
of major catastrophic threats.
In the next section we lay out our framework for measuring the welfare loss from catastrophes that kill people, but leave the consumption of survivors unchanged. In Sections 3 and 4
we present a fully dynamic model with two types of catastrophes that arrive independently
as Poisson processes, one that causes a (random) drop in consumption and the other a (random) number of deaths. We specify distributions for the random impacts of each type, and
we find the WTPs to avert each and to avert both. In Section 5 we calibrate the model using
parameter values consistent with the recent literatures on pandemics and macroeconomic
contractions, calculate the WTPs, and discuss the policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
4

As is clear from Barro and Ursúa (2008), some of the greatest “consumption disasters” during the past
century were the result of major wars. Those wars caused vast numbers of deaths (military and civilian),
the welfare losses from which were likely greater than the losses from reduced consumption.
5

But see Young (2005) and Voigtländer and Voth (2013), who show how pandemics and plagues can raise
welfare over time. For estimates of the negative population externality associated with climate change, see
Bohn and Stuart (2015).

3
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1314

6

Martin and Pindyck: Welfare Costs of Catastrophes: Lost Consumption and Lost Liv

2

Framework

We assume that at time t, Nt identical consumers are alive. Utility for each of them comes
only from consumption, and we denote this utility by u(Ct ). People occasionally die from
“natural” (non-catastrophic) causes, and new people are born.
Without any catastrophes, real per-capita consumption, Ct , grows at the constant rate
g, and we normalise so that at time t = 0, C0 = 1. Likewise the population grows at the
constant net (of natural deaths) rate n, so Nt∗ = N0 ent , where Nt∗ denotes the population
when there are no catastrophe-induced deaths, and we normalise so N0 = 1.
We assume that catastrophes occur as Poisson events with a known mean arrival rate,
and can occur repeatedly. We consider two types of catastrophes. The first type causes a
permanent drop in log consumption by a random fraction φ for the entire population (so
that φ is roughly the fraction by which total consumption falls). Thus if the catastrophic
event first occurs at time t1 , Ct = egt for t < t1 and then falls to Ct = e−φ+gt at t = t1 . Let
λc denote the mean arrival rate of this type of event.
The second type consists of catastrophes which result in the death of a random fraction ψ
of the population, where the distribution of deaths is also random, i.e., each individual has a
probability ψ of dying. This type of catastrophe, however, leaves unchanged the consumption
path for those who remain alive. Thus the first occurrence of a “death” event causes the
population to fall to Nt = e−ψ+nt but leaves Ct unchanged.6 Let λd denote the mean arrival
rate of this type of event. For now we make no assumptions regarding the distributions for
φ and ψ (and these distributions need not be the same).
A person who is living gets utility u(Ct ), but what about a person who dies? We denote
that person’s utility by v(C). This is quite general; v(C) could be a constant, something
independent of C, or some function of C. Why should v(C) be anything other than zero? In
part because people can (and do) make bequests to children and others, and those bequests
typically depend on income and hence consumption. Likewise, governments can redistribute
wealth (and hence consumption) after death, as in Rosen (1988). We will derive an expression
for v(C) shortly.
The total welfare for society is the welfare of those living plus the welfare of those who
died, and we assume that each is proportional to the number of people in that category. The
6

Some of the literature on the value of life makes the opposite assumption that the wealth of the deceased
goes to the living, so that their consumption will rise; see, e.g., Rosen (1988). One might argue instead that
a death catastrophe will lower Ct by causing critical labor shortages. We could allow for this, but at the
cost of complicating the analysis.
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number of people alive is Nt and the number who have died is Nt∗ − Nt , so total welfare is:
Z ∞
Z ∞
−δt
(1)
Nt u(Ct )e dt + E
(Nt∗ − Nt )v(Ct )e−δt dt ,
V0 = E
0

0

where δ is the (common) rate of time preference.
We now make a key assumption: u(Ct ) exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA),
i.e., u(Ct ) = Ct1−η /(1 − η), where η is the index of relative risk aversion. Unless noted
otherwise, we will assume that η > 1. This is consistent with the finance and macroeconomics
literatures, which put η in the range of 2 to 5. Then (1) becomes:

Z ∞
 
1−η
−δt Nt Ct
∗
V0 = E
e
+ (Nt − Nt )v(Ct ) dt ,
(2)
1−η
0
Note that with η > 1, V0 < 0, suggesting that a lower natural rate of population growth
n raises total social welfare. But of course we could have added an arbitrary constant to
the utility function, i.e., written it as u(Ct ) = Ct1−η /(1 − η) + B, and make B sufficiently
large so that u(Ct ) > 0, in which case a lower n would lower total welfare. As B cannot
be determined based on observables, it is not meaningful to ask whether higher or lower
population growth would raise or lower welfare.7 On the other hand, the WTPs we calculate
below are meaningful, and in particular are independent of the positive constant B.
Later, when we calibrate and apply the model, we will be more specific about the nature
of these two types of catastrophes (e.g., a “death” event will be a pandemic). For now we
simply assume that one causes a drop in Ct and the other a drop in Nt . We will want to
calculate the WTP to avert each type, and the WTP to avert both.8

2.1

The Quick and the Dead

To handle catastrophes that cause death, we must aggregate the welfare of those who remain
alive after the event and the welfare of those who die.
What is the welfare loss for a person that dies? One approach to this question is to
simply assume that the consumption of those who die falls to zero. This might make sense
for CRRA utility with η < 1, because then u(C) = C 1−η /(1 − η) = 0 when C = 0. But we
have assumed that η > 1, so utility is negative, and unbounded as C → 0.
7

Note that there is no explicit population externality in eqn. (2). We could introduce such an externality
by writing individual utility as ut = Ct1−η Ntα /(1 − η), so the externality is positive (negative) if α > (<) 0.
Then Nt in eqn. (2) is replaced by Nt1+α , so ∂V0 /∂N > (<) 0 if α < (>) − 1. Population externalities are
not the focus of this paper, so we will not introduce one.
8

We focus on completely averting a catastrophe, but as shown in Martin and Pindyck (2015), our framework also allows for partially alleviating the catastrophe, e.g., by reducing its mean arrival rate.
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An alternative approach, sometimes referred to as “critical-level utilitarianism,” is to
find a minimum consumption level Cm just high enough to sustain (tolerable) life, and then
measure utility relative to u(C − Cm ). (See Broome (2004) and Blackorby et al. (2005).)
But as a matter of calibration, we see no obvious way to determine Cm . More importantly,
in our model C could fall below Cm , and we need a way to compare this to an outcome in
which C falls just to Cm .
Another and perhaps simplest approach is to assume that upon death, utility (as opposed
to consumption) falls to zero, i.e., the individual loses the utility she enjoyed while alive.
But with CRRA utility, this can considerably underestimate the welfare loss from death.
To see this, consider an individual who lives two periods and enjoys the same consumption
C0 = 1 in each period. Ignore discounting and assume η = 2, so her welfare is V = −2C0−1 =
−2. But what if she dies just before the second period? Does she simply lose the utility
she otherwise would have gained from consuming 1 unit? Upon death her consumption goes
to zero and U (0) = −∞, which implies a loss far greater than −1. To see why the loss
must be greater than the utility she otherwise would have received in Period 2, suppose her
consumption in Period 2 fell not to zero, but only by 75%, i.e., to 0.25. Then Period 2 utility
would be −4 and her welfare change would be −4 − (−1) = −3, a much greater loss than
the utility otherwise gained from consuming 1 unit. But consuming only 25% of “normal”
consumption is still (for most people) far preferable to death.
Nonetheless, the usual approach in the literature is to assume that upon death utility
falls to zero. For example, Hall and Jones (2007), in their study of the value of life-extending
health expenditures, do this by adding a positive constant b to the utility function:
u(C) =

1
C 1−η + b .
1−η

For Hall and Jones (2007) the constant b is essential because it allows them to show that
as income and consumption increase, the marginal utility of an extra dollar of consumption
falls relative to the marginal benefit (in terms of an increase in the probability of survival)
from an extra dollar of health care spending.9 In their case, death corresponds to a drop in
consumption from C0 to a value ω such that u(ω) = 0, i.e., ω = [(η − 1)b]1/(1−η) .
9

Becker et al. (2005) also use this formulation, normalise utility at death to be zero, and take η ≈ 0.8 so
that b < 0. With η > 1, a value of b sufficiently large so that u(C) > 0 over any relevant range of C is also
needed to ensure that indifference curves between consumption and life expectancy slope down. See Pratt
and Zeckhauser (1996). In a related paper, Jones (2016) develops a representative agent model in which
research effort can lead to consumption growth, but also the chance of a catastrophe that will kill the agent,
whose utility then falls to zero. Arrow and Priebsch (2014) propose a generalised hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion utility function which is bounded for any value of C.
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We are interested in the loss of welfare resulting from death, but not a comparison of
marginal benefits from additional health care spending, so we can retain the CRRA utility
function without adding a constant. We can then treat death using the same framework
used to treat the utility loss from a drop in consumption. To do this we adopt the VSL
measure that is widely used in public policy.

2.2

The Value of Life

To determine the welfare effects of fatalities, we need to know the value of a life (or more
precisely, the value of a life lost). There is a large literature on this topic, which focuses on
the “value of a statistical life” (VSL), defined as the marginal rate of substitution between
wealth (or future lifetime consumption) and the probability of survival. Thus the VSL tells
us how much an individual (or society) would be willing to pay in terms of a small decrease
in wealth or consumption in return for a small increase in the probability of survival. It
does not tell us how much an individual or society would pay to avoid certain death, or a
significant probability of death, which might be much more than the VSL.10 It also need not
aggregate consistently; a VSL estimate applied to a country’s entire population can easily
exceed the present value of the country’s projected GDP over the next, say, 40 years.11
Many studies have sought to estimate the VSL using data on risk-of-death choices made
by individuals, such as the decision to take a riskier but higher-paying job rather than a safer
one. (See, e.g., Viscusi (1993) and Cropper and Sussman (1990).) The range of estimates is
wide: 3 to 10 times lifetime income or lifetime consumption, with an average value of around
7. Consistent with this average value, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency set the
VSL at about $9 million when it conducted cost-benefit analyses of proposed policies.12
10

Hugonnier et al. (2018) introduce the value of life “calculated at Gunpoint” (GPV), i.e., the WTP to
avoid certain death. They connect the VSL to GPV by valuing the flow of income (when alive) along an
optimal path, and estimate both using data on health and health insurance expenditures for about 8000
people in 2013. They find a VSL of about $8.4 million, but a GPV of only $447 thousand.
11

For an overview of the VSL and its measurement and use, see Andersson and Treich (2009), Ashenfelter
(2006), and Viscusi (2018). The VSL has other issues. For example, the macro/finance literatures put the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, η, well above 1. Estimates of the income elasticity of the VSL are 0.5 to
0.6; see, e.g., Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Kaplow (2005) shows that this low income elasticity is inconsistent
with η > 1. Also, the VSL is a partial equilibrium measure that ignores transfers across society (if I live to
100, the young will have to work harder to support me); see, e.g., Arthur (1981).
12

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2014), page 7-8: “EPA currently recommends a default central
VSL of $7.9 million (in 2008 dollars) to value reduced mortality for all programs and policies.” This translates
to $9.7 million in 2017 dollars. In 2017, U.S. per capita consumption was about $41,000, which corresponds
to lifetime consumption of roughly $1,600,000 (i.e., a factor of 40). The average VSL estimate of 7 times
lifetime consumption yields $11.2 million. Rohlfs et al. (2015), using airbag regulations during the 1990s
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The VSL can be understood as follows. Let w represent wealth or lifetime consumption,
and let p be the ex ante probability of death (so 1 − p is the probability of survival). Suppose
an individual can reduce p at the cost of some reduction in w. Let u(w) be the individual’s
utility if alive, and v(w) her utility if dead, with u(w) > v(w) and u0 (w) > v 0 (w). The
VSL measures the trade-off between wealth (or lifetime consumption) and the probability of
survival, i.e., it is the marginal rate of substitution between w and 1 − p:13
VSL = −

dw
dw
u(w) − v(w)
=
=
.
d(1 − p)
dp
(1 − p)u0 (w) + pv 0 (w)

(3)

Note that u(w) and v(w) are measured in utils, and u0 (w) and v 0 (w) are measured in utils
per dollar, so the VSL is measured in dollars. The VSL is a cardinal measure, invariant to
affine transformations of u or v. Doubling the VSL implies a doubling of the compensation
required to incur an incremental increase in the risk of death. Consistent with the literature,
we take the VSL to be an observable multiple of wealth: VSL = sw.
The VSL is increasing in the ex ante probability of death p; if p is high there is less
incentive to limit spending to reduce p because it is unlikely the individual will survive and
have the opportunity to enjoy whatever wealth remains. (Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) call
this the “dead anyway” effect.) In our case, the ex ante probability of death, whether from
natural causes or a catastrophe, is low. Likewise, most empirical studies of the VSL are
based on the behavior of populations for which p varies, but over a small range and a very
low base value. Thus it is reasonable to evaluate the VSL at p = 0, which we do below.
We emphasise that our reliance on VSL is limited to the calibration of s. This is appropriate despite VSL being a marginal measure because, in our calibrations, even a severe
pandemic implies a small probability of death for each individual member of society. The
WTP calculations we carry out below do not rely on marginal logic other than through
their dependence on the calibration of s. Analogously, in Martin and Pindyck (2015), our
justification for calibrating risk aversion to (say) 2 is implicitly based on studies that come
up with similar numbers based on marginal logic, but once risk aversion is calibrated our
calculations were “global” rather than “local” (i.e., marginal).
and used car prices, find a median VSL between $9 and $11 million, and Aldy (2019), using employment
decisions of married couples, estimates the VSL to be between $9 and $13 million. But Greenstone et al.
(2012), using variation in occupation-specific mortality risks and occupation-specific re-enlistment bonuses,
found that soldiers’ re-enlistment decisions implies a VSL of only $3 to $4 million.
13

To get eqn. (3), note that expected utility is V = (1 − p)u(w) + pv(w). Setting the total derivative
dV = (∂V /∂p)dp + (∂V /∂w)dw = 0 yields dw/dp.
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2.3

The Quick and the Dead Once Again

We can now complete eqn. (2) by deriving an expression for v(Ct ), utility in the “dead”
state. To do this, we will think of u(w) as the utility associated with a wealth level of w
in the hands of a living person, and v(w) as the (social) utility associated with the same
wealth if the person dies and their assets are redistributed, either via intentional bequests to
children or others, or through some other reallocation mechanism. As s is observable and we
can approximate p ≈ 0, from eqn. (3) the relationship between v(w) and u(w) must satisfy
v(w) = u(w) − swu0 (w).

(4)

Each person’s utility while alive is ultimately derived from a flow of consumption, Ct :
Z ∞
1
Expected utility = E
Ct1−η e−δt dt .
1−η
0
As discussed below, we assume that consumption growth is i.i.d., which implies that expected
utility is proportional to C01−η /(1 − η) and that consumption and wealth are proportional to
one another (Martin (2008), Barro (2009)). Thus we can simply work with utility u(w) =
w1−η /(1 − η). As long as we are consistent in whether we work with wealth or consumption,
the constant of proportionality itself is unimportant, given the invariance of the VSL to
affine transformations.
Equation (4) implies that we must have
w1−η
w1−η
1−η
v(w) =
− sw
=
[1 + s (η − 1)]
1−η
1−η
o1−η
1
1 n
=
w [1 + s (η − 1)] 1−η
.
1−η
It follows immediately that the social welfare loss associated with a death is equivalent
to the loss that would occur following a drop in wealth for a living person from w to εw,
where ε is given by:
1

ε = [1 + s(η − 1)] 1−η < 1 .

(5)

Or, if thinking in consumption terms, it is equivalent to the loss following a drop in consumption from C to εC. This means that we can write utility in the “dead” state as
v(C) = (εC)1−η /(1 − η) = [1 + s(η − 1)]C 1−η /(1 − η) ,
and eqn. (2) becomes
Z
V0 = E

∞
−δt

e
0



Nt Ct1−η (Nt∗ − Nt )(εCt )1−η
+
1−η
1−η




dt .

9
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As explained above, estimates of s vary, but the average is around 7, and we will use that
value in much of what follows. Thus if η = 2, ε = 1/(s + 1) = .125, i.e, death is equivalent
in welfare terms to an 88% drop in wealth or consumption. If η = 3, ε = .27, and if η = 4,
ε = .42. Note that ε is increasing in η because a larger value of η implies a larger utility
loss from any given reduction in w or C. The utility loss in (3) is fixed by the VSL, so the
welfare-equivalent reduction in consumption upon death must be smaller if η is larger.
Note that in our model the social welfare loss from a death is equivalent to a percentage
drop in wealth, which implies that this loss depends on the person’s wealth level. In fact,
the VSL itself is increasing in wealth w, because a wealthier individual has more utility to
lose should she die.14 This would be a problem if our objective were to make interpersonal
(or cross-country) comparisons, or to estimate à la Hall and Jones (2007) how the relative
marginal benefit of health care spending varies with income and consumption. We address
a simpler problem by assuming in eqn. (1) that prior to a catastrophe consumption is the
same for everyone, so total welfare is proportional to the population.
Finally, it is important to stress that these results depend critically on our assumption of
CRRA utility. Others have estimated the value of life using more general preferences, and
in particular recursive (non-separable) preferences, which allows for the separation of risk
aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Córdoba and Ripoll (2017), for
example, use Epstein–Weil–Zin (EWZ) recursive preferences to estimate the value of gains
in longevity between 1970 and 2005 across 144 countries. Compared to the CRRA-based
estimates in Becker et al. (2005), they find a larger value of life in poor countries, but not
rich ones. (The reason is that there are diminishing returns to survival in the EWZ model,
so the value of life in poor countries, with shorter life spans, is larger.) And Bommier and
Villeneuve (2012) use EWZ preferences to estimate how the VSL varies as a function of age.
However, we ignore income or age variation, treat the population as homogeneous, and focus
on a catastrophic loss of life, so we avoid the added complication that the EWZ framework
entails.

2.4

Welfare Loss

Initially, static welfare is U0 = N0 C01−η /(1−η). With η > 1 so U0 < 0, it might appear that a
catastrophe-induced drop in N0 raises welfare, but that is not the case. Setting C0 = N0 = 1,
14

Think of D(w) = v(w) − u(w) as the “cost of death,” so expected utility is V = u(w) − pD(w) and we
can rewrite eqn. (3) as dw/dp = D(w)/[u0 (w) + pD0 (w)]. D(w) is increasing in w, as is the VSL. (Thus Bill
Gates has more to lose by dying than most other people.)
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if a fraction ψ of the population dies, welfare becomes
UN = U0 − ψ

1 − ε1−η
< U0
1−η

The adjustment term ψ(1−ε1−η )/(1−η) captures the welfare loss associated with the fraction
of the population that has died, and ensures that UN < U0 . From (5), ε1−η = 1 + s(η − 1),
so UN = [1 + (η − 1)ψs]/(1 − η) < U0 as long as s > 0. And if instead consumption falls by
a fraction φ, welfare becomes UC = (1 − φ)1−η /(1 − η) < U0 .
We can also compare the welfare loss for an event that kills a fraction φ of the population
with the loss for an event that reduces the consumption of everyone by the same fraction.
Let LR denote the ratio of the first welfare loss to the second. Using (5), the (annual) welfare
loss for each person who dies is Ld = u(ε) − u(C0 ) = [ε1−η − 1]/(1 − η) = −s. Since a fraction
φ die, the total loss is −φs. This is independent of η, because the drop in consumption (from
1 to ε) is constrained to yield a welfare loss equal to the VSL. If instead the consumption of
everyone falls by the same fraction φ, the welfare loss is Lc = [(1 − φ)1−η − 1]/(1 − η). (This
loss depends on η because the drop in consumption is fixed.)
The ratio of the welfare loss from death to the loss from reduced consumption is then:
LR = Ld /Lc =

(η − 1)φs
(1 − φ)1−η − 1

If s = 7 and η = 2, for “low” values of φ, e.g., φ = .1, the welfare loss from death is more
than six times the welfare loss from destruction. (As φ → 0, LR → s, i.e., LR approaches
the VSL.) The ratio is large because compared to a drop in consumption, death causes a
much larger loss of utility, albeit for only a fraction φ of the population.
How large would the drop in consumption for all members of society have to be to yield
the same welfare loss as an event that kills a fraction φ? Denoting the equivalent drop in
consumption by φc , using (5), and setting u[(1 − φc )C0 ] − u(C0 ) = φ[u(εC0 ) − u(C0 )],
1

φc = 1 − [sφ(η − 1) + 1] 1−η
If s = 7 and φ = .05, when η = 2, φc = .26, and when η = 4, φc = .21. (Setting φ = .05
corresponds roughly to the Spanish Flu of 1918-19.) If φ = .1, φc = .41 when η = 2 and
.31 when η = 4. So φc is 3 to 5 times as large as φ when φ ≤ .10. However, the multiple is
smaller when φ is large, and can be less than 1 if φ is sufficiently large. (If φ = .8 and η = 4,
φc = .62.) Once again, the VSL constrains Ld , but Lc is unconstrained as φc increases.

11
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3

A Dynamic Model

To determine the welfare loss from a drop in per-capital consumption Ct or a drop in population Nt , we need to describe how these events can unfold over time. We thus turn to a
fully dynamic model, and specify the processes for Ct and Nt . We assume that catastrophic
events that reduce Ct occur as Poisson arrivals with mean arrival rate λc , and the impact of
the kth arrival, φk , is i.i.d. across realisations k. Then the process for consumption is:
ct = log Ct = gt −

Q(t)
X

φk

(6)

k=1

where g is the normal growth rate of per capita consumption, and Q(t) is a Poisson counting
process with known mean arrival rate λc . When the kth catastrophic event occurs, per-capita
consumption is multiplied by the random variable e−φk . (We are scaling consumption so that
C0 = 1 and hence c0 = 0.) We can then define the cumulant-generating function (CGF),
κC,t (θ) ≡ log E ect θ ≡ log E Ctθ .
We showed in Martin and Pindyck (2015) that since log consumption follows a Lévy process,
the CGF is linear in t—that is, κC,t (θ) = κC,1 (θ)t—and we can write

κC (θ) ≡ κC,1 (θ) = gθ + λc E e−θφ − 1 ,

(7)

where φ is a representative of the (i.i.d.) φk .15
We assume that Nt , the population alive at time t, follows an analogous process:
nt = log Nt = nt −

X(t)
X

ψk ,

(8)

k=1

where n is the natural rate of population growth, X(t) is a Poisson counting process with
arrival rate λd that determines how many “death events” have happened by time t, and ψk
measures the size of the kth event. Thus when the kth event occurs, Nt is multiplied by the
random variable e−ψk . We scale Nt so that N0 = 1, and we define the corresponding CGF,
κN,t (θ) ≡ log E ent θ ≡ log E Ntθ .
15

We could easily make the normal growth of consumption stochastic, i.e., replace gt in (6) by any Lévy
process gt (e.g., a Brownian motion). Then gθ in (7) becomes g(θ), the CGF of g1 . The normal rate of
population growth can likewise be stochastic. For simplicity, we limit uncertainty to catastrophic events.
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Once again, the CGF scales linearly with t, so we write

κN (θ) ≡ κN,1 (θ) = nθ + λd E e−θψ − 1

(9)

where ψ is a representative of the (i.i.d.) ψk . Thus
−ψ −1)t

E Nt = eκN (1)t = ent+λd (E e

= ent−λ̃d t .

The term λ̃d = λd (1−E e−ψ ) can be interpreted as the adjusted death arrival rate, taking into
account that only a fraction of the population dies when a death event occurs. Depending on
the relative sizes of n and λ̃d , the population may grow or shrink in expectation: if disasters
are sufficiently frequent (large λd ) or cataclysmic (small E e−ψ ), and population growth n is
sufficiently low, then the expected population is declining in t, in which case κN (1) < 0.
We will use an asterisk to denote the absence of catastrophes. So if there are no death
catastrophes (λd = 0), the population evolves as Nt∗ = ent , and the CGF for Nt is κ∗N (θ) = nθ.
Likewise, if there are no consumption catastrophes (λc = 0), consumption evolves as Ct∗ = egt ,
and the CGF for Ct is κ∗C (θ) = gθ.
Recall that the social welfare loss associated with a death is equivalent to the loss that
would occur from a drop in consumption to a fraction ε of what it was before, i.e., from Ct
to to εCt , where ε is given by eqn. (5). So if no catastrophes are averted, total welfare is
Z

∞

e

V =E
0

−δt



Nt Ct1−η (Nt∗ − Nt )ε1−η Ct1−η
+
1−η
1−η




dt ,

where (Nt∗ − Nt ) is the number of people that have died.
Because Ct is an exponential Lévy process, it evolves independently of Nt . This makes
it easy to calculate the expectations inside the integral above. In particular, E(Nt Ct1−η ) =



∗
E Nt E Ct1−η = eκN (1)t ·eκC (1−η)t and E (Nt∗ − Nt )ε1−η Ct1−η = eκN (1)t − eκN (1)t ε1−η eκC (1−η)t .
Substituting these expressions into the integral above,


1
1 − ε1−η
ε1−η
V =
+
.
1 − η δ − κN (1) − κC (1 − η) δ − κ∗N (1) − κC (1 − η)

(10)

To interpret this equation, note that the second term captures the welfare associated with
the guaranteed consumption stream εCt (which is “received” via bequests, etc., even after
death). We can think of δ − κ∗N (1) = δ − n as the social rate of time preference (i.e., discount
rate on future utility) associated with this consumption stream: it adjusts, via κ∗N (1) = n,
for the fact that the population is increasing (so that the larger is n, the lower is the discount
rate, and because V < 0, the lower is total welfare). The first term captures the welfare
13
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associated with the additional ongoing consumption stream (1 − ε)Ct received by those who
are still alive (i.e., those alive receive (1 − ε)C + εC = C). Since there is a risk of death, this
latter consumption stream is discounted at the higher rate δ − κN (1) > δ − κ∗N (1).16
We want to find the WTPs to avert each type of catastrophe individually, and the WTP
to avert both. Averting a consumption catastrophe corresponds to setting λc = 0. The
WTP wc is defined as the fraction of consumption that people would be prepared to sacrifice
permanently in order to avert the catastrophe. We define the WTPs to avert the death
catastrophe (wd ), and to avert both catastrophes (wc,d ), similarly.
Result 1. The WTPs to avert the consumption catastrophe, death catastrophe, or both
catastrophes, satisfy, respectively,
(1 − wc )1−η = A × B × C

(11)

(1 − wd )1−η = C

(12)

(1 − wc,d )1−η = A × C

(13)

where
A =

δ − κ∗N (1) − κ∗C (1 − η)
δ − κ∗N (1) − κC (1 − η)

(14)

B =

δ − κN (1) − κ∗C (1 − η)
δ − κN (1)ε1−η − (1 − ε1−η )κ∗N (1) − κ∗C (1 − η)

(15)

C =

δ − κN (1)ε1−η − (1 − ε1−η )κ∗N (1) − κC (1 − η)
.
δ − κN (1) − κC (1 − η)

(16)

Proof. Averting the consumption catastrophe corresponds to replacing κC (1 − η) by κ∗C (1 −
η) ≡ g(1 − η). If it is averted at the cost of a permanent loss of a fraction wc of consumption,
welfare is
(1 − wc )1−η
Vc =
1−η



1 − ε1−η
ε1−η
+
δ − κN (1) − κ∗C (1 − η) δ − κ∗N (1) − κ∗C (1 − η)


.

(17)

The WTP is found by equating (10) to (17); doing so gives equation (11).
To find the WTP to avoid only the death catastrophe, note that if a fraction wd of
consumption is sacrificed to avert, welfare is
Z ∞



1−η ∗ 1−η
Nt Ct
(1 − wd )1−η
1
−δt (1 − wd )
Vd = E
e
dt =
. (18)
1−η
1−η
δ − κ∗N (1) − κC (1 − η)
0
The expressions 1/ [δ − κN (1) − κC (1 − η)] and 1/ [δ − κ∗N (1) − κC (1 − η)] can be interpreted as the
valuation ratios of the two consumption streams, as shown by Martin (2013). Because V < 0, a higher value
of δ implies a higher value of V . However, we treat δ as fixed and ignore how it might be determined.
16
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Equation (12) follows by setting (10) equal to (18). Lastly, if a fraction wc,d of consumption
is sacrificed to avert both catastrophes, welfare is


(1 − wc,d )1−η
1
Vc,d =
.
1−η
δ − κ∗N (1) − κ∗C (1 − η)

(19)

Equating (10) and (19) gives equation (13) for wc,d .
Below, we determine precise values for wc , wd , and wc,d in some quantitative examples.
But we have the following result which holds in general.
Result 2. Independent of the distributions of catastrophe sizes, or their frequency, we have
max {wc , wd } < wc,d < wc + wd − wc wd .
Proof. As η > 1, we have A > 1 and B < 1 < C, using the facts that κ∗C (1 − η) < κC (1 − η),
κ∗N (1) > κN (1), and ε1−η > 1. We also have BC > 1, as the expressions for B and C can
be rewritten
(ε1−η − 1) (κ∗N (1) − κN (1))
B =1−
δ − κN (1)ε1−η + (ε1−η − 1) κ∗N (1) − κ∗C (1 − η)
and

1
(ε1−η − 1) (κ∗N (1) − κN (1))
=1−
,
C
δ − κN (1)ε1−η + (ε1−η − 1) κ∗N (1) − κC (1 − η)

whence B > 1/C. These inequalities give the claimed results.
In particular, the WTPs do not add—wc,d 6= wc + wd —so that the two catastrophes are
interdependent.17

4

Impact Distributions and WTPs

Our results so far are quite general, in that the CGFs of eqns. (7) and (9) apply to any
probability distributions for the impacts φ and ψ. In order to apply the model, we will
assume that φ and ψ are exponentially distributed. This distribution has often been used to
model catastrophic events, and considerably simplifies the expressions for the WTPs:
fφ (x) = βc e−βc x

for x ≥ 0

and fψ (x) = βd e−βd x

for x ≥ 0.

17

The inequality in Martin and Pindyck (2015) (page 2957) that applied to two types of consumption
catastrophes (1 and 2) said only that w1,2 < w1 + w2 ; in fact the stronger result that w1,2 < w1 + w2 − w1 w2
also applies in that context.

15
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This is equivalent to assuming that zc = e−φ and zd = e−ψ , the surviving (post-impact)
fractions of consumption and people, follow the power distributions b(zc ) = βc zcβc −1 for
0 ≤ zc ≤ 1 and b(zd ) = βd zdβd −1 for 0 ≤ zd ≤ 1. Note that E(φ) = 1/βc and E(zc ) = E e−φ =
βc /(βc + 1), and similarly for ψ and zd . Thus large values of βc and βd imply small expected
impacts, i.e., small values of E(φ) and E(ψ) and large values of E(zc ) and E(zd ).
Given these distributions for φ and ψ, the CGFs are
κC (1 − η) = g(1 − η) −

λc (1 − η)
βc + (1 − η)

and κN (1) = n −

λd
βd + 1

As always, κ∗C (1 − η) = g(1 − η) and κ∗N (1) = n.
We can substitute these CGFs into the expressions for the three factors A, B, and C
that are multiplied together in (11) to determine each of the WTPs. Define
ρ ≡ δ − n + g(η − 1)
One can think of ρ as the discount rate on future total consumption (as opposed to δ − n,
the discount rate on future utility). It accounts for the growth of total consumption via n
and also the decline in marginal utility of per capita consumption via g. Also define
λ0c ≡ λc (η − 1)/(βc + 1 − η)
λ0d ≡ λd /(βd + 1)
One can think of λ0c and λ0d as risk- and impact-adjusted arrival rates for the two types of
catastrophes. For example, increasing βd reduces the expected impact of a death catastrophe,
which is welfare-equivalent to reducing its expected arrival rate. And λ0c further adjusts
for risk aversion; increasing η increases the utility loss from a catastrophe that reduces
consumption, which is welfare-equivalent to increasing its expected arrival rate.
Substituting the CGFs, λ0c , λ0d , and ρ ≡ δ − n + g(η − 1) into (14), (15), and (16), the
factors A, B, and C become:
A =

ρ
ρ − λ0c

B =

ρ + λ0d
ρ + λ0d ε1−η

C =

ρ + λ0d ε1−η − λ0c
ρ + λ0d − λ0c

The next result uses these expressions for A, B, and C to get the WTPs.
16
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Result 3. Under the distributional assumptions made in this section,
(ρ − λ0c )(ρ + λ0d ε1−η )(ρ + λ0d − λ0c )
= 1−
ρ(ρ + λ0d )(ρ + λ0d ε1−η − λ0c )
1

 η−1
(ρ + λ0d − λ0c )
= 1−
(ρ + λ0d ε1−η − λ0c )
 1

(ρ − λ0c )(ρ + λ0d − λ0c ) η−1
= 1−
ρ(ρ + λ0d ε1−η − λ0c )


wc
wd
wc,d

1
 η−1

Proof. The result follows on using the expressions for A, B, and C in the relationships
(1 − wc )1−η = ABC, (1 − wd )1−η = C, and (1 − wc,d )1−η = AC.
Note that wc < 1 (and wc,d < 1) only if ρ > λ0c . Recall that ρ is a discount rate on
future consumption, but ignoring consumption catastrophes. Thus one can think of λ0c as a
depreciation rate that accounts for the risk- and impact-adjusted arrival rate of consumption
catastrophes, and thereby reduces the expected future welfare from consumption. If the net
discount rate ρ − λ0c is zero, the welfare loss from the catastrophes is unbounded, pushing
the WTP to avoid the catastrophes to one.
Also note that ∂wd /∂λ0c > 0 and ∂wc /∂λ0d > 0, i.e., an increase in the likelihood of
catastrophe i increases the WTP to avert catastrophe j. Each potential catastrophe creates
“background risk” that raises the WTP to avert the other catastrophe. As we will see in
the next section when we examine pandemics and consumption contractions, these effects of
“background risk” can be substantial.
To determine which catastrophes (if any) should be averted, we would also need to
know the cost of averting each one, expressed as a permanent tax on consumption at rates
denoted by τc and τd . We would then calculate the net (of taxes) welfare of doing nothing
(W0 ), averting only consumption catastrophes (Wc ), averting only death catastrophes (Wd ),
and averting both (Wc,d ), and choose the one that is highest. Because a death catastrophe
divides the population into two groups with different levels of consumption, Result 2 of
Martin and Pindyck (2015) does not hold. Thus we must calculate the net welfare for each
possible policy to find the optimal one.
Using eqns. (10), (17), (18), (19) and the expressions above for the CGFs, the net welfare
for each policy is:


1
s(η − 1) + 1
−s(η − 1)
W0 =
+
1 − η ρ + λ0d − λ0c
ρ − λ0c


(1 − τc )1−η ρ + λ0d (s(η − 1) + 1)
Wc =
1−η
ρ(ρ + λ0d )
17
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Wd =
Wc,d =

(1 − τd )1−η
(1 − η)(ρ − λ0c )

(1 − τc )1−η (1 − τd )1−η
(1 − η)ρ

An increase in λd (and thus λ0d ) reduces Wc , net welfare when the consumption catastrophe
is eliminated, and an increase in λc (and thus λ0c ) reduces Wd , net welfare when the death
catastrophe is eliminated. This is the loss of welfare created by “background risk,” here the
risk created by the second catastrophe. (And of course an increase in λd or λc also reduces
W0 , net welfare when neither catastrophe is eliminated.)

5

Lost Consumption vs. Lost Lives

We turn now to the threat of major pandemics and its interdependence with the threat of
macroeconomic contractions. What is the WTP to avoid each, and the connection between
the two? To address these questions we need values for the mean arrival times λd and λc ,
the impact parameters βd and βc , and the parameters s, g, n, δ and η.

5.1

Pandemics

According to an assessment by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the
threat of a “mega-virus” that could cause widespread fatalities is considerable: “While we
can’t predict exactly when or where the next epidemic or pandemic will begin, we know one is
coming.” The main reasons: “Increased risk of infectious pathogens spilling over from animals
to humans; development of antimicrobial resistance; spread of infectious diseases through
global travel and trade; acts of bioterrorism; and weak public health infrastructures.”18
Our experience with major pandemics is (fortunately) limited, making the calibration
of λd and βd somewhat speculative. (However, as we write, the COVID-19 coronavirus
pandemic is spreading around the world.) During the past century the Spanish Flu was by
far the worst pandemic, but there were several others, though not as severe. For example,
the 1957-1958 H2N2 pandemic killed 1.1 million worldwide and 116,000 in the U.S. (for a
U.S. fatality rate of .0064); the 1968 H3N2 pandemic killed about 1 million worldwide and
100,000 in the U.S.(for a U.S. fatality rate of .0006); and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic killed
18

https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fieldupdates/winter-2017. The CDC is especially
concerned with the possibility of a pandemic resulting from mutations of the Asian H7N9 avian influenza
virus: “. . . the pandemic potential of this virus is concerning. Influenza viruses constantly change and it is
possible that this virus could gain the ability to spread easily and sustainably among people, triggering a
global outbreak of disease.” See https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-virus.htm.
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12,469 in the U.S. And then there is HIV/AIDS, which killed more than 700,000 in the U.S.
since the epidemic began in 1985, and worldwide close to a million people in 2017 alone.
Based on these numbers and assuming that the likelihood and potential virulence has
remained about the same, we would set λd = .02 (i.e., an event on average every 50 years and
a 33-percent chance of at least one more in the next 20 years) and βd = 24 (consistent with
the roughly 4-percent U.S. mortality rate of the Spanish Flu). These numbers would imply
that the probability of a pandemic over the next 20 years with at least a 4-percent (8-percent)
mortality rate is .14 (.05).19 However, well before the arrival of COVID-19, epidemiologists
have argued that major pandemics have become much more likely and could be much more
virulent. For example, Jones et al. (2008) analyse 335 “emerging infectious diseases” from
1940 through 2004, and show sharp increases in the numbers of events over time, after
controlling for reporting bias.20 Although these studies do not provide specific estimates
of the current likelihood of a major pandemic or possible mortality rates, a doubling of λd
to .04, while holding βd fixed at 24, is consistent with the literature. This would imply a
55-percent chance of another pandemic (of some size) in the next 20 years, and implies that
the probability of a pandemic occurring in the next 20 years with at least a 4 percent (8
percent) mortality rate is .26 (.10).
Given the uncertainties involved, we consider both of these parameterisations: a “lowrisk” pandemic scenario roughly matching the past century, i.e., with λd = .02 and βd = 24,
and a “high-risk” scenario with λd = .04 and βd = 24.

5.2

Consumption Catastrophes

A major recession can be viewed as a pure consumption catastrophe. We want to estimate
the frequency of such events (i.e., the Poisson arrival rate λc ) and their average intensity
(i.e., the power distribution parameter βc ). This can be done in two different ways.
19

For Poisson arrivals with mean a arrival rate λ and exponentially distributed impact with parameter β,
the probability of at least one event with loss ≥ L over the horizon T is
P r(T, L) = 1 − exp[−λT ((1 − L)β ] ,
and the expected total loss over the horizon T is E(L; T ) = 1 − exp[−λT /(β + 1)].
20
Also, in part because of the overuse of antibiotics, strains of bacteria have evolved that are resistant to
most or all antibiotics. See Byrne (2008), Kilbourne (2008) and Enserink (2004), and for a detailed discussion
of the increased likelihood and severity of pandemics, Harvard Global Health Institute (2018). Fan et al.
(2018) point out that most estimates of the costs of pandemics ignore the cost of lost lives. They estimate
that cost using age-specific mortality rates following the 1918 Spanish Flu. However, they consider a known
pandemic as opposed to the random arrival of pandemics, with an increasing arrival rate.
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The most common approach, used by Barro (2006, 2009), Barro and Ursúa (2008), Nakamura et al. (2013) and others, is to rely on historical data, e.g., a panel of countries over
the past century. For example, Barro and Ursúa (2008), whose results we will use, estimate arrival rates and intensity from a panel of 36 countries (for GDP) from 1870 to 2006.
One problem with this approach is that these catastrophes are, almost by definition, “rare
events,” limiting what we can learn from even a century or more of data. Also, many of
the catastrophes that these and other authors have studied are manifestations of just three
global events—World Wars I and II and the Great Depression. Nonetheless, given that this
approach is so widely used, we will draw upon these studies to calibrate λc and βc .
A second approach is to ask what arrival rate and impact distribution are implied by
the behavior of economic and financial variables. Martin (2008) shows, for example, that
the economy’s consumption-wealth ratio along with the preference parameters δ and η are
sufficient to estimate the welfare effects of eliminating or reducing consumption uncertainty,
without knowing the stochastic process for consumption. Pindyck and Wang (2013) develop
an equilibrium model of the economy with shocks to the capital stock, which, as here, are
Poisson events with known arrival rate and exponential impact distribution. Using data
on consumption, investment, output, the risk-free rate, and the first four moments of stock
returns, they determine λc and βc , as well as η and δ, as calibration outputs. They find
η ≈ 3.1, δ ≈ .05, λ = .73 and β = 23.2, implying that catastrophes are frequent (occurring
about every 1.4 years on average) but with a mean loss of only about 4% (so most shocks
are small and can be viewed as part of the normal fluctuations in the economy).21 Backus
et al. (2011) use the prices of equity index options to infer the characteristics of consumption
contractions; they also find that shocks are more frequent but smaller on average than
suggested by estimates obtained from historical consumption data.
To calibrate our model, we will draw upon Barro and Ursúa (2008). Using world GDP
data, but only including declines of 10-percent or greater, they estimate an annual arrival
rate of λ0c = .036 and average decline of 20.8 percent. Thus for all declines, the parameters
are λc = .079 and βc = 7.3.22 These numbers imply a contraction every 13 years on average,
with an average contraction size of 12 percent. They also imply that the probability of a
contraction occurring in the next 20 years of at least 10 percent (25 percent) in magnitude
21

But as explained in Pindyck and Wang (2013), pp. 320–321, these results are similar to those in Barro
and Jin (2011), and those in Barro and Ursúa (2008) using U.S. GDP data. Barro and Jin (2011) and
Barro and Ursúa (2008) only include contractions greater than .095 and .10 respectively. Transforming their
estimates to account for all contractions yields relatively large numbers for λc and βc , as shown below.
22

E(L|L ≥ .10) = .208, so βc = 7.3 is the solution to 1 − .9βc /(βc + 1) = .208. Likewise, λc = .079 is the
solution to 1 − exp(−λc (.9)7.3 ) = λ0c = .036 = annual probability of 1 event with loss L ≥ .10.
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Figure 1: Probability of shock of size L or greater during next 20 years, and expected
cumulative loss, for each of four catastrophes.
is .52 (.18). We refer to this calibration as BU1.
As an alternative, we also use the Barro and Ursúa (2008) data for GDP contractions
of 10-percent or more in the U.S. They document 5 such contractions over 137 years with
an average contraction size of 15.5 percent.23 Adding the 2008 recession and its estimated
contraction size of 10 percent24 yields 6 contractions over 149 years, so λ0c = .040, and an
average contraction size of 14.6 percent. Adjusting to allow for contractions of any size yields
λc = .29 and βc = 18.6, which implies much more frequent (every 3.4 years on average) but
smaller contractions (5 percent on average), and are closer to the results in Pindyck and
Wang (2013) and Backus et al. (2011). This calibration (which we refer to as BU2) implies
that the probability of a contraction in the next 20 years of at least 10 percent (25 percent)
is .56 (.03).
The left-hand panel of Figure 1 plots the probability of a contraction of size L or greater
occurring during the next 20 years for both calibrations, and illustrates how they differ. The
average contraction size in BU2 is much smaller than in BU1, but the greater frequency
of contractions results in a greater expected cumulative loss over time, as shown by the
23

From page 270 and Table C2, the contractions were “10 percent in 1908 and 1914 ..., 12 percent in 1921,
29 percent in 1933, and 16 percent in 1947.”
24

See, e.g., Fernald et al. (2017) and Barnichon et al. (2018).
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right-hand panel of Figure 1.25 Thus we treat BU2 as the more “severe” parameterisation.
Figure 1 also includes the pandemic calibrations. It shows the probability of a loss L
or greater during the next 20 years and the expected total loss for both the “low-risk” and
“high-risk” calibrations, i.e., (λd , βd ) = (.02, 24) and (λd , βd ) = (.04, 24). Here the loss is the
fraction of the population that dies, so although the expected total loss is much lower than
it is for consumption contractions, that does not make the corresponding WTP lower.

5.3

WTPs

The WTPs also depend on η, δ, g, n and the VSL parameter s. We use values for η and
δ broadly consistent with both the macro/finance and “disaster” literatures. Pindyck and
Wang (2013) obtain η ≈ 3.1 and δ ≈ .05 as a calibration output of their general equilibrium
model. Using estimates of λ and β for historical GDP contractions, Barro and Ursúa (2008)
and Barro (2009) find that η ≈ 3.5 or 4 and δ ≈ .05 are consistent with an unlevered equity
premium of .05. We will set δ = .05 and η = 3, and examine how the WTPs vary with
η. Historical data for the U.S. puts g = .02 and n = .01. We set s = 7, which is in the
mid-range of most estimates, so ε1−η = s(η − 1) + 1 = 7η − 6. However, estimates of the
VSL (and thus s) vary widely, so we also examine how the WTPs vary with s.
We calculate the WTP to avert each catastrophe and the WTP to avert both, i.e., wc , wd ,
and wc,d . To gauge the interdependence of the two catastrophes, we also calculate wc0 and
wd0 , the WTP to avert one but ignoring the presence of the other. We calculate these
WTPs for two sets of calibrations: (1) (λc , βc ) = (.08, 7.3) and (λd , βd ) = (.02, 24); and (2)
(λc , βc ) = (.29, 18.6) and (λd , βd ) = (.04, 24). Set (1) can be viewed as relatively “low risk,”
in that the total expected losses for both catastrophes are smaller than for set (2).
Figure 2 shows the WTPs as functions of η (for s = 7) and s (for η = 3) for the “low-risk”
set of calibrations, and Figure 3 for the “high-risk” set. Three things stand out. First, the
WTPs are large, even for the “low-risk” calibration. Note from Figure 2 that the WTP
to avert a pandemic like the Spanish Flu — with an annual likelihood of 2 percent — is
around 10% of consumption. The WTP to avert consumption contractions is around 23% of
consumption for η = 3, and higher for η > 3. This may seem high, but is within the range
of estimates by others of the welfare costs of consumption uncertainty. For example, Barro
(2009) estimates the welfare cost at about 20% of GDP, Martin (2008) gets an estimate of
about 14% (for η = 4 and δ = .03, but about 25% for η = 3 and δ = .05), and Pindyck
25

For any horizon T , the expected total loss, E(L; T ) = 1 − exp[−λT /(β + 1)], is increasing in λ/(β + 1),
which is .0095 for BC1 and .0145 for BC2. We are assuming that contractions are permanent, although
Nakamura et al. (2013) have shown that on average about half of the lost GDP is regained during recoveries.
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Figure 2: WTP vs η and s, (λc , βc ) = (.08, 7.3) and (λd , βd ) = (.02, 24).
and Wang (2013) get a WTP of 30% (15%) of consumption to eliminate all contractions
greater than 5% (10%). For the “high-risk” parameterisations in Figure 3, the WTPs are
much higher: 18% (31%) of consumption to eliminate pandemic (consumption) risk.
Second, the interaction between the two catastrophes is strong, although it depends on η.
For η ≥ 1.5, a good part of each WTP results from the “background risk” coming from the
threat of the other catastrophe. For example, if η = 3 and s = 7, for the “low-risk” (“highrisk”) parameterisations, consumption risk accounts for about 40 percent (35 percent) of the
10% (18%) WTP to avert pandemics, and pandemic risk accounts for about 13 percent (17
percent) of the 23% (31%) WTP to eliminate consumption risk. This interdependence is
even greater for larger values of η, as illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the ratios wc0 /wc
and wd0 /wd as functions of η for the two calibrations. The dependence on η comes about
because the threat of Catastrophe i reduces expected future consumption, which increases
the future marginal utility of consumption by an amount increasing in η, and this raises the
value of averting Catastrophe j, which if it occurs would further reduce consumption.
Third, the dependence of the WTPs on η is complicated. In Figure 2 both wd and wc
decrease and then increase with η, and in Figure 3, wd is always decreasing with η and wc is
roughly constant. Increasing η has two off-setting effects. First, it increases the risk- (and
impact-) adjusted arrival rate for the consumption catastrophe, λ0c (but has no effect on the
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Figure 3: WTP vs η and s, (λc , βc ) = (.29, 18.6) and (λd , βd ) = (.04, 24).
impact-adjusted arrival rate for the death catastrophe, λ0d ), which increases both wd and wc .
Second, it increases ρ, the effective discount rate on future total consumption, Nt Ct , and
this reduces the WTPs. Thus in general, ∂w/∂η is indeterminate.

5.4

Some Implications

The high values of wc and wc0 support earlier studies that found the welfare costs of (unpredictable) macroeconomic contractions to be large, but they add an important element:
These costs are partly due to the threat of other catastrophes, in this case pandemics. Pandemic risk, a problem in its own right, adds to the welfare cost of consumption risk. And
pandemics are just one source of “background risk;” here we are ignoring the other potential
catastrophes (nuclear and bioterrorism, climate, earthquakes, etc.) examined in Martin and
Pindyck (2015). Likewise, macroeconomic risk is an important component of the welfare
costs of pandemics. The WTP to avoid future pandemics would be about a third lower if
we could somehow eliminate macroeconomic fluctuations.
But even without “background risk” and even for the conservative calibration of Figure 2, the WTP to avoid pandemics is substantial — depending on η, at least 5 to 10% of
consumption. For the U.S. in 2018, this translates to around $1 trillion per year, and would
be much higher if we account for consumption risk and use the calibration of Figure 3 (which
24
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Figure 4: Interdependence of WTPs: wi0 is the WTP to avert i but ignoring the threat of j.
assumes that pandemics have become more likely and more virulent).
As the right-hand panels of Figures 2 and 3 make clear, these high values for wd and
wd0 are dependent on the VSL parameter s. Reducing s from its base value of 7 to, say, 3
cuts wd roughly in half in both calibrations. So is s = 7 the “correct” value to use for this
parameter? It is in the mid-range of estimates and consistent with the VSL values of $9
to $10 million used by U.S. regulatory agencies, but it values the lives of the entire U.S.
population at about $3,000 trillion, which is some 4 times greater than the roughly $800
trillion present value of U.S. GDP over the next 40 years. When large numbers of lives are
involved — as is the case with pandemics — aggregating individuals’ VSL values (based on
small reductions in the risk of death) will overstate society’s WTP to save lives.
However, even if we reduce s to 2 or 3, the WTP to avert pandemics is high — some 4%
to 9% of consumption ($0.5 to $1.3 trillion for the U.S. in 2018), depending on the calibration
and on η. Is this completely unrealistic? Remember that the WTP is a reservation price,
i.e., the maximum fraction of consumption society would be willing to sacrifice to achieve
a policy objective. The cost of achieving this objective might be much lower, and indeed
for pandemics that appears to be the case. Several studies have concluded that pandemic
risk could be greatly reduced (but not eliminated entirely) at a cost well below our WTP
numbers. But these studies also make clear that we should be spending far more than we
currently are on pandemics, a policy position strongly supported by our results.26
26

See, for example, National Academy of Medicine (2016) and Harvard Global Health Institute (2018).
The entire FY 2018 budget for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was about $8 billion.
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6

Conclusions

In our earlier work we showed that decisions to avert (fully or partially) major catastrophes
are interdependent, even if the catastrophes themselves are independent, and we showed how
to determine which ones to avert. But as with most (if not all) of the literature, we assumed
that catastrophes only cause a reduction in the flow of consumption. Here we have shown
how catastrophes that cause death can be incorporated into our framework. In so doing, we
link the VSL and consumption disaster literatures.
Because we work with CRRA utility and a constant rate of time preference, consumption
and wealth are proportional to each other, and we have shown that the social welfare loss from
a death is equivalent to the loss that would occur from a drop in wealth (or consumption)
from w to εw (or C to εC) for a living person, where ε is tied to the VSL via eqn. (5). We use
estimates of the VSL to determine the value of ε and thus the utility loss from death. We can
then find the WTPs to avert a “death” catastrophe (wd ), a consumption catastrophe (wc ),
and both (wc,d ). Our general results hold for any probability distributions for the random
reductions φ and ψ of log C and log N , but if φ and ψ are exponentially distributed, these
WTPs are very easy to calculate.
We used our model to explore the welfare implications of the threat of pandemics, a
threat that epidemiologists argue is substantial and growing. We did this in the context
of macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the ongoing threat of sharp consumption
contractions. There is a large literature on consumption disasters, which we used to calibrate
the parameters for the stochastic process for consumption. The literature on pandemics is
more speculative, but sufficient to reasonably calibrate the corresponding parameters. We
find the utility loss from a “death” catastrophe is large, as is the WTP to avert it. Using
middle-of-the-road estimates of the VSL and conservative estimates of the likelihood and
impact distribution, we find the WTP to avert future pandemics to be well over 10% of
consumption. We also found that a good portion of the WTP to avert pandemics comes
from “background risk,” here the threat of a consumption catastrophe. Likewise, the threat
of pandemics substantially affects the WTP to avert consumption catastrophes. This is
another example of the policy interdependence of major catastrophic threats.
One could argue that middle-of-the-road estimates of the VSL are unrealistically large
when applied to catastrophes that could kill many people. But even a much smaller value
for the VSL results in a WTP to avert pandemics that is far large than current expenditures.
An important caveat to this paper is our starting assumption in eqn. (1) that social
welfare is proportional to the size of the population N . How should we think about the
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welfare effects of changes in population? This question has received considerable attention
by economists and philosophers, but there is no consensus regarding the social value of more
or fewer people.27 As a practical matter, society spends considerable resources to save lives,
including the lives of the very old and very young, and prevent life-threatening disasters
large and small. Consistent with this, a catastrophic loss of life reduces social welfare in our
model. (However the welfare effect of a change in the natural rate of population growth is
indeterminate.)
A second caveat is that CRRA utility plays a central role in our model, and considerably
simplifies the analysis. But CRRA utility is restrictive (it ties the coefficient of relative risk
aversion to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution), which is why others have explored
the use of EWZ recursive preferences to determine the dependence of the VSL on income or
age. But we treat consumers as homogeneous, so it is unclear that much would be gained
by adding the complication that recursive preferences entails.
Finally, we have assumed that a “death” catastrophe does not affect the consumption of
those who survive. As we are currently learning from COVID-19, a serious pandemic can
certainly damage the economy and reduce the consumption of the survivors. Although we
have not done so, our model can be expanded to incorporate such spillover effects.
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